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ABSTRACT 
 
Reliability based methods are at the core of Eurocode structural design. Partial load factors, combined with 
material safety factors, are derived from First Order Reliability Methods (FORM) with the intention of 
ensuring that structural elements or sub-frame assemblies have an appropriately low probability of failure. 
The acceptable probability of failure is informed by the likely consequences, with societal risk expectations 
influencing what level of confidence must be achieved in a design solution. 
 
Fire development and subsequent structural response depend upon numerous factors, invariably featuring 
a high degree of uncertainty. Whilst permitted within performance-based frameworks, and supported by 
design codes, the appraisal of structural response in fire in a deterministic manner is challenging given the 
plethora of sources of uncertainty that exist. 
 
It has become increasingly common practice for UK practitioners to adopt reliability based assessments 
for appraising the fire resistance requirements for structural elements. The acceptance criteria for such 
analyses are often informed by the work undertaken in the development of BS 9999, which defines an 
'overall reliability target' as a function of height and use. These reliability targets are then augmented by 
consequence factors to account for variances in evacuation mode, i.e. buildings with a prolonged 
evacuation regime are afforded a higher consequence classification. The cons of such an approach come 
in situations where: (a) a building is mixed use (as is often the case), (b) height is not an appropriate proxy 
for the quantification of probability of fire occurrence nor consequence of failure, and/or (c) the building 
is not in the UK. 
 
The paper discussed how ambient temperature target probabilities of failure, such as those based on cost 
optimisation or documented in EN 1990, can be used to inform fire resistance design solutions. The 
spectrum of fire severities expected within a simple steel structure office building are appraised via Latin 
Hypercube Sampling (LHS). Fire resistance solutions are reviewed for different consequence classes, with 
the results contrasted against established reliability methods and prescriptive conventions. The conclusions 
suggest that ambient reliability targets have relevance. However, it may be preferable to define two 
reliability targets for structural performance for: (1) during evacuation, and (2) longer term probability of 
failure (burn-out). 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Performance based structural fire engineering 
design implicitly requires the approximation of a 
safety goal and a means of estimating if it has been 
fulfilled. Often, this process is deterministic. That 
is, the engineer selects a series of inputs and 
properties that, when applied within various models 
(fire dynamics, heat transfer and / or structural 
response), inform design solutions that are deemed 
to be adequate. The design solution may be 
premised on the selection of onerous inputs from 
the ranges / distributions expected (a reasonable 
worst case) or it may be afforded an appropriate 
factor of safety. Irrespective of the means, the 
acceptance of any resulting solution can only be 
premised upon one of two grounds: (a) adequate 
experience / precedent, or (b) a very high degree of 
conservatism. In neither case is the safety target 
explicit, nor are the grounds for accepting a design 
solution universally valid. For instance: (a) infers 
that there is a compatibility between the design 
being developed and those that exist for which there 
is bountiful experience (i.e. common situations), 
and (b) implies that the consequences are 
comprehensible and, as a result, an estimation of 
the required safety margin can be made. In either 
case it can be summarised that deterministic 
assessments only have validity for fairly 
straightforward, low complexity, proportionally 
low consequence of failure structures. For more 
complex, unusual or high consequence structures, 
there is a need to explicitly define safety targets and 
develop fire resistance solutions capable of 
fulfilling them. These explicit safety targets could 
be founded upon one of three common ambitions: 
(a) fulfilling a minimum societally accepted 
robustness target, (b) ensuring that a minimum 
societally accepted robustness target is fulfilled, 
whilst optimising investment in safety measures 
over a building’s life, or (c) achieving an explicit 
resilience target. 
 
Both (a) and (b) principally purport to address life 
safety, whilst (c) sits within the domain of property 
/ asset protection. All targets necessitate the need 
for stochastic variables to be identified and for 
some form of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
to be undertaken. This paper draws upon 
experiences and methods developed within 
structural engineering to review how they might be 
applied to inform life safety targets for structures 
exposed to fire. It also briefly summarises common 
safety targets currently employed in structural fire 
engineering applications. 
 
2. SAFETY TARGETS IN 
STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING 
 
A number of differing means of determining the 
safety target for general structural design are 
present in the literature and / or are subject to 
widespread application. These are briefly 
summarised below. 
 
2.1 EUROCODE - BASIS OF DESIGN 
Reliability based methods are at the core of 
Eurocode structural design. Partial load factors, 
combined with material safety factors, are derived 
from First Order Reliability Methods (FORM) with 
the intention of ensuring that structural elements or 
sub-frame assemblies have an appropriately low 
probability of failure. Implicitly, for a design 
following EN 1990 [1] and the partial factors in 
Annex A, the safety target is 1.3 x 10-6 for a one 
year reference period. That is, all design solutions 
should achieve a reliability index (β) of 3.8 in a 
building’s conceptual design life (50 years).  
 
Annex B offers additional context to Annex A in 
support of PRA applications, whereby structures 
are grouped into consequence classes and afforded 
differing safety targets, i.e. as per the below for a 
one year reference period. 
 
 Reliability class 1 – low consequences – 
buildings where people rarely enter – β = 4.2; 
 Reliability class 2 – Medium consequences – 
e.g. a typical office buildings – β = 4.7; and 
 Reliability class 3 – High consequences – e.g. 
high rise buildings – β = 5.2. 
2.2 JCSS 2001 – COST OPTIMISATION 
The Joint Council on Structural Safety (JCSS) 
provide tentative failure rates as a function of safety 
measure investment and failure consequences [2]. 
For the more typical case, i.e. where investments in 
safety measures are moderate, the following safety 
targets are given: 
 Minor failure consequences – β = 3.7; 
 Moderate failure consequences – β = 4.2; and 
 Large failure consequences – β = 4.4. 
Consequences are classified according to the ratio 
of total costs (i.e. construction costs plus direct 
failure costs) and construction costs. Given this, the 
failure rates cannot be applied in a life safety 
context without a separate consideration of societal 
risk / acceptance. 
2.3 THE LIFE QUALITY INDEX (LQI) 
LQI is effectively a derivative of cost optimisation, 
with investments in safety measures balanced 
against the willingness of society to invest in those 
safety measures.  
 
The philosophy behind the LQI is that the 
preference for society to invest in safety measures 
is influenced by life expectancy at birth, GDP and 
the relative proportions of working time vs. leisure 
time. It is, in essence, a lower boundary condition 
for private cost optimisation (see Figure 1 below). 
 
Figure 1 – LQI as a boundary condition to 
monetary optimisation [3] 
The safety target is derived in consideration of 
marginal lifesaving costs, relative cost of safety 
measures (i.e. relative to the total construction 
costs) and the consequences of failure (fatalities). 
Further background and application examples can 
be found in Fischer & Faber [3] and ISO 2394 [4]. 
 
3. SAFETY TARGETS IN STRUCTURAL 
FIRE ENGINEERING 
 
Limited comparable literature exists in relation to 
deriving safety targets for fire exposed structures. 
 
3.1 BACKGROUND TO BS 9999 
 
The broad aim of the fire resistance guidance in BS 
9999 [5], is the delivery of a consistent level of risk 
across all building types and heights. For this to be 
achieved, as the frequency of fires and consequence 
of failure increases, the reliability of the fire 
resistance system must also increase. This 
manifests in the tabulated guidance through 
increases in fire resistance with height.  
In the process of developing the ventilation-based 
fire resistance tables of BS 9999, the then 
committee [6] sought to explicitly quantify the fire 
resistance life safety goal in terms of the number of 
fully developed (or significant) fires that the fire 
resistance system (inclusive of active and passive 
components) should resist as an overall proportion 
of the range of fully developed (or significant) fires 
that might occur. In doing so, a number of 
idealisations were made to conform to the current 
UK prescriptive framework: 
 The frequency with which fires occur is directly 
influenced by a building’s area. Buildings of 
greater height typically feature a greater number 
of storeys and, thus, area. Therefore, the 
frequency of fire occurrence for a given building 
could be idealised as being proportional to 
height; 
 Should a significant fire occur, there is a 
reliability associated with the fire resistance 
system’s ability to resist failure. Specifically, 
this relates to the robustness of an isolated 
element, not that of a structural system; and 
 If a fire occurs and it leads to failure of a 
building’s structural element(s), the 
consequence for those in (or in the vicinity of) 
the building is proportional to height. This is on 
the premise that buildings of greater height have 
greater area (and, thus, occupants) and that taller 
buildings have a greater impact on surrounding 
neighbourhoods, should a building suffer 
collapse. 
The resulting relationship between target risk and 
building height underpinning BS 9999 is, therefore, 
proportional to height squared. Figure 2 below 
shows the corresponding relationship between 
target reliability and height for an office building. 
It should be noted that the simplistic risk correlation 
presented by Kirby, et. al., is anchored to the 
prescriptive guidance within Approved Document 
B (ADB) [7], such that the 80th percentile 
corresponds with an office building 18m in height.  
 
Figure 2 – Relationship between height and 
target reliability implicit within BS 9999 for an 
office 
 
3.2 THE NFSC 
 
In the case of the Natural Fire Safety Concept 
(NFSC) Valorisation Project [7], which 
subsequently informed the development of EN 
1991-1-2 [8], a constant explicit probability of 
failure was chosen (7.23 x 10-5 per conceptual 
building life (50 years), or 1.3 x 10-6 for a one year 
reference period) corresponding to the same 
criterion for general / ambient temperature (ULS) 
structural design. The Valorisation Project does 
note that an accidental condition, such as fire, can 
be distinguished from normal service conditions, as 
a function of evacuation mode and, thus, 
consequence of failure. Example values from the 
NFSC are shown below. The NFSC permits the 
derivation of a negative reliability index (β) where 
measures are put in place to prevent the 
development of a significant fire, i.e. through 
highly effective fire safety management. This could 
hypothetically mean that fire protection may be 
omitted on the basis of ignition control measures. 
Table 1 – NFSC element safety targets by 
building type (1 year reference period) 
Evacuation  
Acceptable Probability of 
Failure  
Typical, i.e. simultaneous 1.3 x 10-4 
Prolonged, e.g. phased or 
progressive 
1.3 x 10-5 
Unlikely, e.g. super-high-
rise 
1.3 x 10-6 
 
4. ELEMENT FAILURE 
PROBABILITIES FOR A SIMPLE FIRE 
EXPOSED STEEL STRUCTURE 
 
To assess the relevance of the safety targets 
discussed in Section 2, a pilot study has been 
developed for a straightforward steel building. The 
relevant inputs and considerations are discussed 
below. 
 
4.1 TRIAL BUILDING(S) & SOLUTIONS 
 
The building employed in the pilot study is a simple 
monolith, used as an office in the UK. On plan, it is 
assumed to be 500 m2 in net internal area (NIA), 
with glazing to all elevations from floor to ceiling. 
The floor to ceiling height is 3 m.  
 
Each floor is a fire compartment and compartments 
can be stacked to form buildings of different 
heights and, thus, consequence classes. The cases 
considered are: 
 Case A – Low-rise – ground plus one < 5.0 m in 
height; 
 Case B – Low-Mid-rise – ground plus six < 18.0 
m in height; 
 Case C – Mid-rise- ground plus ten < 30.0 m in 
height; and 
 Case D – High-rise – ground plus twenty > 30.0 
m in height. 
The structure is assumed to be steel and the element 
subject to appraisal herein is a beam, formed from 
S355 steel, with a section factor of 150 m-1 and a 
limiting temperature of 620°C. For the given cases 
A – D, the corresponding prescriptive fire 
resistance solution according to Approved 
Document B is given in Table 2. Alongside this, the 
thickness of a notional insulation material required 
to prevent a temperature rise above that of the 
limiting temperature at the target fire resistance 
period is also given. This has been determined 
according to BS EN 1993-1-2 [10]. It should be 
noted that the solution for Case D includes sprinkler 
protection alongside the insulation thickness 
corresponding with 120 minutes structural fire 
resistance. For completeness, insulation properties 
are given in Table 3 also. 
Table 2 – FR solutions & insulation thicknesses 
Case 
FR Solution 
(min) 
Insulation 
thickness 
(mm) 
A 30 6 
B 60 14 
C 90 21 
D 120 27 
Table 3 – Insulation properties 
Property Metric Unit 
Conductivity 0.2 W/m.K 
Specific Heat 1,700 J/kg.K 
Density 800 kg/m3 
4.2 PROBABILISTIC FACTORS LEADING 
TO A FIRE INDUCED STRUCTURAL 
FAILURE 
 
The events that lead-up to a potential structural 
failure in the event of fire all have a probability of 
occurring. In the first instance a fire must develop 
(pig), subsequently there must be a compound 
failure of early intervention by the occupants (pf,u), 
active measures (pf,s) and the fire brigade (pf,fb). 
From this point, the fire may become fully 
developed (or significant).  
Allied to this, the structure (Pf,fi) must be 
sufficiently affected by the fully developed fire 
such that it undergoes damage and, potentially, fails 
(i.e. Pf,1) as a result of fire. This process can be 
shown via an event tree, as per Figure 3 proposed 
by Van Coile, et. al [11]. Within this, two domains 
have been further identified, the “event instigation” 
and “response” domains. 
 
Figure 3 – Stochastic factors leading to a fire induced structural failure [11] 
 
Figure 4 – Flow chart summarising one iteration of the Monte Carlo analysis 
4.3 STOCHASTIC VARIABLES 
 
For the purposes of analysis herein, the sources of 
uncertainty are limited to the thermal domain. 
Specifically, factors influencing how a fire might 
develop. Depending upon the choice of fire model, 
different variables (inputs) are relevant. The 
adopted stochastic variables are summarised below. 
 
Table 4 – Stochastic fire inputs 
Input Distribution Comment 
Fire load density 
(MJ/m2) 
LN 
Mean = 420 
Std. = 126 
Heat release 
(kW/m2) 
C 290 
Glazing failure 
(%) 
U Range = 5 - 100 
Near field 
temperature (°C) 
N 
Mean = 1,050 
Std. = 64.5 
Spread rate 
(mm/s) 
U Range = 5 – 19 
LN – Log Normal, C – Constant, U – Uniform, N – Normal 
 
The likelihood of a fire occurring is also a source of 
uncertainty. Within the event instigation domain, 
there is firstly the likelihood that a fire occurs. 
Subsequent to this, there are numerous 
interventions that are possible which prevent the 
fire from becoming significant. The basic 
likelihood values within the NFSC concept are 
adopted for an office, i.e. a per annum fire 
probability of between 2 – 4 x 10-7 per m2. These 
relate to cases where occupants and the fire brigade 
have a ‘typical’ chance of successful intervention. 
The median value is adopted in arriving at Section 
4.7, i.e. 3 x 10-7 fires per annum per m2. 
 
For cases where sprinklers are considered, a failure 
probability of 10% is adopted. This reduces the 
significant fire likelihood by an order of magnitude.  
 
4.4 SAMPLING PROCESS AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
With reference to Figure 3, in the “event instigation 
domain” the likelihood of a significant fire 
occurrence, i.e. one whereby none of the occupants, 
fire brigade or active measures (where relevant) 
have successfully prevented a fire from becoming 
fully developed, is estimated based on the proposals 
documented in the NFSC Valorisation project 
(discussed in 4.3). From this point, and within the 
response domain, fires will manifest in different 
ways / severities, which elicit different types of 
structural element response.  
 
Figure 4 provides an overview of the processes 
involved in defining a design fire and assessing 
whether or not the design fire leads to a structural 
element failure. The figure concerns one model 
realisation. The iterative sampling process is 
repeated for different fire resistance solutions, e.g. 
30, 60 and 90 minutes. Typically, the accepted 
solution would be the optimal protection thickness 
that ensures the probability of failure is less than a 
defined safety target. 
 
4.5 FIRE MODELS 
 
Within Figure 4, two fire models are apparent 
(Figure 5). One relates to a travelling fire [12], the 
other a Eurocode parametric fire. Decision metrics 
are presented within the process flow chart which 
define the circumstances under which different fire 
models are deployed. A key distinction in the 
travelling fire method employed herein compared 
to others is that of the influence of ventilation. That 
is, the travelling fire adopted can be subject to a 
ventilation controlled limit. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Fire model types – TF – Travelling 
Fire vs. PAR – Parametric Fire 
 
4.6 SEVERITY / FAILURE METRIC 
 
The study presented herein does not purport to 
address the ‘failure’ of a structural system.  
 
It focusses upon the probability of failure of an 
isolated element when afforded specific protection 
solutions. Therefore, a critical temperature based 
criteria is adopted to assess ‘failure’. The metric 
adopted is a simple utilisation based concept, which 
allows for future incorporation of other 
uncertainties (such as yield strength and applied 
action), i.e.  
µ = σa / kyfy 
 
With µ the utilisation (-), σa the applied stress, and 
ky the temperature reduction factor for the yield 
strength fy.  
 
The applied stress is chosen such that the ambient 
utilisation yields a limiting temperature of 620°C. 
A utilisation in exceedance of unity denotes 
‘failure’.  
 
4.7 LHS RESULTS 
 
For 10,000 Latin Hypercube Samples per fire 
resistance design solution, Figure 6 presents the 
relationship between element utilisation and the 
probability of exceeding a given utilisation, when 
subject to natural fires. Each curve represents a fire 
resistance (protection) solution.  
 
From this, failure probabilities can be deduced by 
determining the points at which the utilisation is in 
exceedance of unity, for a given fire resistance 
solution. The results are summarised in below. 
 
Table 5 – Element failure probabilities as a 
function of fire resistance solution (one year 
reference period) 
Case Solution P(f) 
A FR30 ≈ 1 x 10-4 
B FR60 ≈ 1 x 10-5 
C FR90 ≈ 3 x 10-6 
D FR120 + 
sprinklers 
≈ 1 x 10-7 
 
5. COMPARISON WITH ESTABLISHED 
AMBIENT SAFETY TARGETS 
 
The results of Section 4.7 are contrasted with the 
safety targets discussed in Sections 2 and 3 with 
intent of establishing the consistency between 
safety targets presented in the literature for 
structural (fire) engineering, and those that appear 
to be inherent within Approved Document B. 
5.1 TENTATIVE CONSEQUENCE GROUPING 
 
For the purpose of appraising the cases investigated 
(A to D), each case is grouped (tentatively) into a 
consequence class. This is proposed as follows: 
 
 Case A – Nominal (minor) consequences; 
 Case B – Low consequences; 
 Case C – Moderate consequences; and 
 Case D – High consequences. 
 
5.2 COMPARISON WITH AMBIENT SAFETY 
TARGETS  
 
The Latin Hypercube study results for different fire 
resistance solutions can be contrasted with tentative 
consequence groupings in Section 5.1 and the 
differing means of deriving safety targets in Section 
2 to assess the relevance of these methods for 
structural fire design. 
 
Based solely upon crude cost optimisation after the 
JCSS, the element fire resistances required as a 
function of consequence class is as follows: 
 
(a) Minor consequences – target failure 
probability ≈ 1 x 10-4 – 30 minutes fire 
resistance; 
(b) Moderate consequences - target failure 
probability ≈ 1 x 10-5 – 60 minutes fire 
resistance; and 
(c) High consequences - target failure 
probability ≈ 5 x 10-6 – 90 minutes fire 
resistance. 
 
In contrast, the corresponding figures for Annex B 
of EN 1990 are as follows: 
 
(a) Reliability class 1 (low consequences) – 
target failure probability ≈ 1 x 10-5 – 60 
minutes fire resistance; 
(b) Reliability class 2 (Moderate consequences) 
- target failure probability ≈ 1 x 10-6 – 120 
minutes fire resistance; and 
(c) Reliability class 3 (High consequences) - 
target failure probability ≈ 1 x 10-7 – 120 
minutes fire resistance, plus sprinklers. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 6 – Prob. of exceeding a given utilisation for different active and / or passive solutions
6. DISCUSSION 
 
The results in Section 4.7 and the benchmarking 
outlined in Section 5 are discussed in differing 
contexts below. 
 
6.1 ADB INHERENT SAFETY TARGETS 
 
For a straightforward office building, with 
uncertainty limited to idealisations of the fire 
conditions, tentative failure probabilities for 
isolated steel elements afforded different fire 
resistance solutions have been determined. These 
generally show good agreement with the cost-
optimisation safety targets noted in the JCSS 
Probabilistic Model Code, except for taller 
buildings, where sprinklers would commonly be 
included as part of the fire safety solution(s). 
 
For the four cases investigated (A – D), there is 
approximately a linear relationship between height 
and reliability index (β), as shown in Figure 7. This 
is subject to the fire resistance solution being 
commensurate with height and according to the 
guidance within ADB. 
 
 
Figure 7 – Tenative relationship between height 
and reliability index for a straightforward ADB 
office 
 
Practically, the relationship between height and 
reliability index presented in Figure 7 cannot be 
extrapolated before quickly converging on a safety 
target that is unfeasibly small. Therefore, for 
‘special structures’, it may be prudent to impose an 
upper bound safety target. 
 
6.2 BASIS OF SOCIETAL ACCEPTANCE 
 
By adopting the JCSS (cost-optimisation) safety 
targets, it can be seen that the resulting fire 
resistance solutions are inconsistent with those that 
would be proposed within the prescriptive guidance 
to the Building Regulations (Approved Document 
B). Tentatively, they would support a reduced 
investment in safety measures. This is largely 
consistent with the findings of Kirby, et. al. when 
developing BS 9999, where office fire resistance 
proposals are typically less onerous than those 
recommended in Approved Document B. The latter, 
however, has significant precedent, as it has been 
widely used for straightforward buildings for a 
number of decades. The absence of change to the 
guidance therein could be interpreted as an 
acceptance of the safety levels achieved. This has 
been the basis of the development of other methods 
that seek to define the safety targets for tall 
apartment buildings [13]. Therefore, as is noted in 
ISO 2394, cost-optimisation does not guarantee that 
minimum societal safety expectations are attained. 
A logical extension of the work herein would be to 
check the compatibility of the cost-optimisation 
targets with minimal societal targets, informed by 
metrics, such as the Life Quality Index. 
 
6.3 ROBUSTNESS 
 
Despite the good intentions of EN 1990 to permit 
the adoption of transparent safety targets via Annex 
B, there is ambiguity regarding the safety levels 
achieved in a whole or sub-frame context. Whilst 
safety targets are set for isolated elements and sub-
frames as a function of consequence, additional 
disproportionate collapse requirements result in 
additional ‘factors of safety’. These can arise due to 
additional ties, notional removal methods, key 
element methods and systematic risk assessment. 
 
The same principle could be considered for 
structural fire engineering, whereby the safety 
target for the structure must be fulfilled for fully 
developed fires without any adjustment for the 
likelihood of a significant fire developing when, for 
example, sprinklers are provided. However, 
generally, it is considered that an explicit safety 
target should be set without hidden safety margins. 
This introduces further complications in terms of 
defining what failure means for sub-frame or 
whole-frame assemblies.  
  
6.4 TRANSIENT SAFETY TARGETS 
 
Unlike sudden structural collapse, fire is a transient 
phenomenon that is often accompanied with 
forewarning. This alone means that there is 
reasonable grounds on which to challenge the 
relevance of ambient temperature safety targets 
when adopted or altered for the purpose of 
structural fire engineering assessments. The NFSC 
that is now inherent within Annex E of BS EN 
1991-1-2 is premised upon a simple alteration to the 
EN 1990 ambient safety targets in cognisance of the 
fact that fire occurrence has an associated (low) 
probability. When approaching design with a ‘fire 
resistance’ mind set, this has credence. Fire 
resistance is a proxy for the performance required 
of elements such that they can withstand the burn-
out of an appropriate realistic fire. Therefore, the 
performance goal is largely independent of time as 
the final outcome is a structure robust to the burn-
out of an appropriately severe fire. In practice, 
however, the consequence of a fire induced 
structural failure is time-dependant. In most typical 
office situations, for example, the building will be 
progressively evacuated, meaning the risk of 
fatalities reduces with time.  
 
What is fundamental, therefore, is that the 
probability of failure whilst a building is heavily 
occupied is very small. This potentially brings 
about a need for two life safety targets, one which 
defines the target for burn-out and another which 
requires that during the early evacuation phases 
premature fire induced structural failure has an 
exceptionally small likelihood. This is shown 
indicatively in Figure 8. The figure serves to 
demonstrate that for some types of building, e.g. 
high-rise, the burn-out and evacuation safety targets 
may coincide due to the impracticalities of 
evacuating tall buildings or due to the evacuation 
strategy being premised on refuge floors / 
‘invacuation’. In considering two life safety states, 
it suggests that reliance upon active measures alone 
(such as sprinklers) may be inappropriate as the 
failure probability of that single safety measure 
could be incompatible with safety targets for the 
evacuation phases. This is reinforced within typical 
prescriptive guidance whereby structures are 
typically afforded a minimum passive safety 
measure alongside active measures (e.g. 30 minutes 
fire resistance). 
 
Figure 8 – Indicative relationship between 
height and reliability index for two life safety 
targets – evacuation phase vs. burn-out 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of the study presented herein are 
as follows: 
 
 The paper has presented a novel 
probabilistic risk assessment approach, 
making use of Latin hypercube sampling to 
generate an array of possible fire conditions 
for a straightforward steel structure office 
building;  
 These fires have been adopted to 
approximate the failure probabilities 
associated with different fire resistance 
solutions as would be common for differing 
heights of building;  
 The study has allowed for the 
benchmarking of the outcomes against 
prescriptive guidance (ADB), leading to a 
tentative approximation of the inherent 
element failure probabilities as a function of 
height; 
 The derived failure probabilities show 
reasonable consistency with those noted in 
the JCSS Probabilistic Model Code 
concerning cost optimisation; and 
 Finally, the paper identifies a need for the 
distinction of two life safety targets for most 
buildings, i.e. one that distinguishes the 
burn-out requirement versus the evacuation 
phase requirement. 
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